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A critique of the type-type identity theory (with emphasis on the main criticisms in philosophy of mind and Islamic philosophy)
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Rouhollah Sadrollahi   |
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Abstract: (218 Views) |
Introduction: The mind-body problem has been an important and challenging issue from pre-Socratic philosophers to the period of the philosophers of mind. Does the truth of human beings consist of these quantifiable, locatable, and temporal physical properties, or does it have a reality beyond these physical characteristics? Within ourselves, humans receive qualities such as: life, will, happiness, fear, consciousness, responsibility, love, etc. that philosophers of mind interpret as "mental qualities" which are different from the physical properties of the brain. The type-type identity theory argues that the type of mental state we have is of a specific type of physical state. In other words, all mental affairs, in this perspective, are reduced to physical affairs. In this article, using a descriptive method, the theory and reasons of its supporters are first discussed. Then, through an analytical method, we critique this perspective from the standpoint of contemporary philosophy of mind and Islamic philosophy. In this research, the criticisms that refer to the structural differences of mind and brain are discussed. That is, by using the principle of the logical non-identity and by employing the arguments of Muslim philosophers, in explaining the structural differences between the effects of the mind and the brain, the type identity theory is criticized.
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| Keywords: mind, brain, type identity theory, philosophy of mind, Islamic philosophy |
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Full-Text [PDF 245 kb]
(29 Downloads)
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Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
General
Received: 2024/02/22 | Accepted: 2023/08/10 | Published: 2023/08/10
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